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Introduction to Lesbian and Gay Studies 
 
Abstract 
 
A  Theory of the Affective Body 
 
This lecture is going to be a kind of tangential swerve away from what we’ve been 
studying thus far. What I’m going to present today is less a theory of gender, sex, and 
more a way of thinking, a style of thinking in the way of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
manifesto. Who are Deleuze and Guattari? Gilles Deleuze was a professor of 
philosophy at the University of Paris; and Felix Guattari, a psychoanalyst at the La Borde 
- an experimental psychiatric clinic - and activist who started the antipsychiatry 
movement in France. They teamed up in 1972 to write Anti-Oedipe, translated into 
English, anti-Oedipus: capitalism and schizophrenia, in 1977, followed by a sequel Mille 
Plateaux, 1980 the English version A Thousand Plateaus, where the reading for today is 
lifted, came out in 1988. I think it’s important that the text is a kind of double text, 
written by two authors, a philosopher and a psychoanalyst, an activist - not one. There is 
no one voice which is significant. DaG continue to hold a certain currency in almost 
every faculty of the arts, from history, politics, anthropology, and social science, to art 
history, music, architecture, literature, photography, And for better or worse they have 
both infiltrated and spawned recent discourses on feminism and sexuality, on identity, 
subjectivity and the body. Who can resist Deleuze and Guattari? 
 
Maybe you had problems reading DaG: But if you start asking yourself whether you’re 
taking DaG too literally, too materially or not materially or literally enough, you are 
reading Deleuze and Guattari. They revel in this impossible materialising of abstract 
thought, theirs is a conviction in the materiality of thinking. Ideas are things, there is no 
separate realm of abstract ideas. If you think the concept you just read has turned into 
something or someone altogether different from what you thought, then you’re reading 
Deleuze and Guattari. Their concepts change over time, an article, or a page. And yet, 
somehow there is a strange schizo-logic of connectivity in their work. Their most 
important idea which I will go into later is becoming, which informs their very 
construction of their concepts which they do not regard as having fixity or permanence. 
What always remains however, is the theory of flows and surfaces about which the flows 
traverse. 
 
Anti-Oedipus is a perverse reading of Marx and Freud but not in the way of yet another 
Freudian/Marxist synthesis. Traditionally, such attempts have maintained the separation 
between the two economies: the political economy (the flows of capital and interest) and 
the economy of the libido (the flows of desire). Deleuze and Guattari’s radical project is a 
proposal for the “one same economy, an economy of flows.” [AO xviii] A flow is a 
passage of events, actions and productions which produce further events, actions and 
productions. In their economy, capitalist discourse functions as a production of desire. 
Foucault in his introduction to Anti-Oedipus describes this book [and I quote] as the 
“analysis of the relationship of desire to reality and to the capitalist “machine” . . . its 
questions are less concerned with why this or that thought than with how to proceed. [and 
  
I hope you noticed this how to character in the essay] It is the connection of desire to 
reality (and not its retreat into the forms of representation) that possesses revolutionary 
force. How does one introduce desire into thought, into discourse, into action?” he 
continues to say that anti-Oedipus is an introduction to the non fascist life, an art of living 
the non fascist life. Deleuze and Guattari insist, in the way of Nietzsche, that the fascist is 
inside of all of us. That it is no longer possible to pretend that we are the good, [the 
innocent] that the fascist is outside of us, [big brother,] the deviant “other” [who 
persecutes us]—rather, there operates an unacknowledged desire for fascism inside of all 
of us that itself must be confronted before anything political can be accomplished. The 
desire to be enslaved and the fascist that resides within are flip sides of a political coin 
that Deleuze and Guattari wish to expose in their ambitious project. 
 
DaG do not address the specifics of gender or sex within the context of these discourses 
we are familiarising ourselves with, but instead wish to reinscribe a discourse of desire 
and sex, in a political sphere where these are notably absent. Whereas other so called post 
modern authors have written about the body as an object and construct of the state, such 
as Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari, following Nietzsche, turn the persecution inwards, on 
each person, returning the agency partially to the individual her/himself. The fascist is not 
out there, the fascist if you and me. 
 
The Body Without Organs appears repeatedly in many of their writings. It appears as an 
essay - first in anti Oedipus - called the BwO that I’m going to start with, and then 
resurfaces in Mille Plateaux as “How Do You Make Yourself a BwO?” [We’re going to 
start with the BwO in Anti Oedipus which should shed light on the assigned reading.] 
 
In Anti-Oedipus the BwO is at once the Marxian body of capital, and the body of the 
schizophrenic, as in Artaud, the disturbed poet and artist from whom DaG took the phrase 
BwO, who will return to later. The BwO is a critical concept for Deleuze and Guattari; in 
many ways it sets up their entire project, appearing as the second chapter in Anti-
Oedipus, in a classic Deleuze and guattarian criticism of psychoanalysis that they then 
continued for ten years after this. The BwO is a model for Marx’s criticism of capital and 
its fallacious inscription in capitalist society, as the true or natural cause of production. 
The BwO is capital itself, a production of desire that reinscribes social production on its 
surface. [and to quote Deleuze and Guattari:] 
 
 [Capital is the BwO,] constituting a surface over which the forces and agents of production are 
distributed, thereby appropriating for itself all surplus production and arrogating to itself both the 
whole and the parts of the process, which now seem to emanate from it as a quasi cause. Forces 
and agents come to represent a miraculous form of its own power: they appear to be “miraculated” 
by it. In a word, the socius as a full body forms a surface where all production is recorded, 
whereupon the entire process appears to emanate from this recording surface. Capital is indeed the 
BwO of the capitalist, or rather of the capitalist being. But as such, it is not only the fluid and 
petrified substance of money, for it will give to the sterility of money the form whereby money 
produces money. Everything seems objectively to be produced by capital as quasi cause. . . . 
 
For those who aren’t familiar with the Marx, I’m going to quickly take you through his 
classic formulation: What is Capital? Marx defines Capital in two very precise and 
different capacities: Capital is [and I quote] “the raw materials, instruments of labour and 
  
means of subsistence USED in order to produce NEW materials, instruments of labour 
and new means of subsistence.” So a material/real notion of capital, that is the thing 
itself, rice cotton or wheat, are examples. But he also says that capital is “the sum of 
commodities,” the sum of EXCHANGE VALUES; how much something can be sold for 
- and that Capital remains the same whether it is rice, cotton or wheat as long as they all 
have the same exchange value. In this second account, capital as value, capital turns out 
to be a strange disembodied quality - value or meaning that is embodied somehow within 
the merchandise. The material/real conception of capital as product contrasts with the 
abstract or spiritual quality of price or value and it is this very conflict between the real 
and the abstraction of capital that is at the heart of Marx’s thinking. 
 
How does a commodity becomes capital? He asks [Commodities are products which are 
exchangeable for others.] Simply, a commodity becomes capital, it becomes valuable, 
only through the labour power that converts it into one, but more importantly, he 
describes it as the power of a portion of society, that maintains and reproduces itself by 
virtue of its exchange for direct, living labour power. He says, quote: “The existence of a 
class which possesses nothing but its capacity to labour is a necessary prerequisite of 
capital.” So capital is produced through labour, through a labour class. Now here comes 
the argument: What Marx observed is that in the very process whereby a commodity 
becomes capital, i.e. in the specifically capitalist mode of production, where an item 
accrues surplus value, somehow in a strange inversion of what’s really going on, it 
appears as if it is capital itself, and not the labour class that is the cause of the productive 
powers of labour. “Capital thus [and I quote Marx] becomes a very mystic being since all 
of labour’s social productive forces appear to be due to capital, rather than labour as such, 
and seem to issue from the womb of capital itself.” The claim is that capital appears to be 
the magical inherent value in things, rather than the work and social structure that in 
reality is what makes possible the making valuable of things. 
 
So the BwO as capital, has a materiality in the bodily product or material itself, but these 
serve simply to embody the mystical miraculating power of the constructed value, the 
exchange value of commodities which deterritorialises the labourers power—consisting 
in actual labour—and transfers the force of this labour as the cause of production from 
labour to capital. But it is a disembodied body, emptied of all real relations, a body 
without organs. The BwO, is the body, they claim, that Marx is referring to when he says 
that it is not the product of labour, but rather appears as its natural or divine supposition. 
So the BwO is capital itself, the empty and magical non-productive surface on which is 
inscribed all the productive social relations of labour.  
 
The BwO seems to parallel Marx’s conclusions but there are certain aspects that serve to 
complicate the original version of Marxism. The first is their idea of the non 
production or antiproduction of capital, or the BwO. Deleuze and Guattari—in a 
dialogue with Marx’s notion of production: production of capital, production of social 
relations—distinguish between two forms of production desiring-production (capital or 
the Body Without Organs – capital is never attained or gasped, always pursued) and 
social-production (a full body that functions as a socius) They argue that forms of both 
desiring-production and social-production involve an element of non-production, of 
  
anti-production that is the empty BwO. The BwO, is the unproductive the 
unconsumable (in this way capital is unlike labour and labour power that gets used 
up over the course of someone’s day, week and eventually lifetime). This anti-
production frames what Marx already says but as a positive term. So while Marx, speaks 
of capital as an absence, a social delusion, DaG reinscribe it as a production, albeit an 
anti-production. 
 
The second way they complicate Marx is by saying that the construction of capital 
as the true source of production is itself produced as an inscription or recording—
capitalism’s inscription of itself. So again, rather than a loss, the construction of 
capital is itself a production, in what they describe as the surface of inscription on 
the, “[The BwO] The BwO they say serves as a surface for the recording of the entire 
process of production of desire, so that desiring machines seem to emanate from it in the 
apparent objective movement that establishes a relationship between the machines and 
the body without organs.” And “It is an enchanted recording or inscribing surface that 
arrogates to itself all the productive forces and all the organs of production, and that acts 
as a quasi cause by communicating the apparent movement (the fetish) to them.”  
 
The next thing to pay attention to is their distinction between production and inscription; 
they observe that “production is not recorded in the same way it is produced…” [and 
quote]  
 
we have passed imperceptibly into a domain of the production of recording, whose law is not the 
same as that of the production of production…when the productive connections pass from 
machines to the BwO (as from labour to capital), it would seem that they then come under another 
law that expresses a distribution in relation to the unproductive element as a “natural or divine 
supposition” (the disjunctions of capital) 
 
So we have the actual production of a labour class, production of production, but in 
the shift of attribution of power from labour to capital, the re-inscription on the 
BwO of capital itself, is effected as a recording of production, a non-production as 
productivity itself – the construction of capital as the miraculating cause of social 
production, occurs as a record[ing] in the BwO’s surface of inscription.  
 
In the translator’s note, recording is intended as both the inscription of codes, such as the 
documentation of births, deaths and marriages—but also in the sense of a record that you 
listen to, a creative production, the documentation of a creative enunciation. In the 
beginning of Mille Plateaux, Deleuze and Guattari talk about their book as a record that 
can be started or listened to from any point and put away at any point and started again 
and again from whatever place is desired. So the surface of capital I think is also like this, 
it is the capitalist recording or inscription that effects the shift from labour to capital—the 
redistribution that makes the unproductive productive, through a natural or divine 
supposition. And to overstate the claim, it is that surface that re-orders what which is 
considered the source of production, productivity itself. Capital is rendered pure 
productivity.  
 
  
However, the record is not simply the inscription of this inversion, in a simple reversal. In 
its place, on this surface all activity, all production, everything is inscribed, recorded on 
the surface of the BwO that Deleuze and Guattari say “swarms with them like a lion’s 
mane swarms with fleas.” So like the audible record, it has many starting points and can 
be read as many fragments and contradictions. So the surface is inscribed with both the 
actual social relations of labour, the full body, as well as the recording of the dominant 
discourse where capital is prioritised and comes to stand for pure productivity. They 
never actually come out and say anything as definitive as I just did; this is my reading of 
their project which I welcome you to challenge. In short, who knows what they were 
thinking. 
 
In any case, it looks if anything, like they respect Marx’s basic tenet, but we need to 
understand the very different social contexts in which the two texts emerged. Deleuze’s 
capitalism, 1972 is very different to Marx’s 1850 1849(?) and again differs from what 
today might be called Late capitalism. DaG’s critique of capitalism complexifies Marx’s 
statements, but the basic perversion of social production to the desiring production of the 
BwO, the fetish body of capital, is retained and moreover framed as a recording: a 
production that is inscribed on the BwO.  
 
What I want you to take note of is what this construction or - to use deleuzian 
phraseology – production, the Body Without Organs does to Marx’s basic formulation in 
its very enframing with a language of productions. Their Marxism is effectively 
communicated through a spatial language that engages the body, the emptying of the 
body, the social body. And a substitution of desire for what has been lost in the emptying, 
in a reinscription on the surface of the Body Without Organs. It deals in surfaces and 
bodies. This spatialising and sexualising of Marx’s language is an important part of their 
project. The way of thinking becomes the thinking itself. 
 
Given this background in anti-Oedipus, what about the BwO in A Thousand Plateaus that 
you’ve read for today? Before we go into what is the BwO in Mille Plateaux, I want to 
briefly comment on the mode of writing that takes effect in “How To Make yourself a 
BwO.” Whereas Anti-Oedipus gives us a fairly reasonable description of the BwO, How 
Do You Make Yourself A BwO, as the title implies, rather than explaining the what of 
the BwO, is didactic, it insists on showing us how to do something. It is a performative, 
It’s name is the title of how to do something and somehow the essay itself accomplishes 
what it is a set of instructions for. But it also inverts this performativity by retracting what 
it offers in the injunctive. The How-to-Make of the title is actually an incorrect 
translation, because in French the phrase is intended to read: how to Fuck a Body 
Without Organs – so there is this double meaning lost in the translation. But it isn’t just a 
neutral set of instructions, How to make yourself a BwO is a violent injunction. Whereas 
Foucault and Derrida carefully mask their discourses as anti-narratives, in what I call a 
postmodern humility—in Deleuze, an ironic fascist tone takes over, theirs is almost 
always in the voice or scream of the injunctive (find your body without organs, find out 
how to make it). So we should hold Deleuze and Guattari against Ruben, Watney, Butler, 
Foucault and start to pay attention to the style, and voice that writers use to conduct their 
polemics.  
  
 
As a footnote, we might wish to reassess Foucault or Derrida, et al and the almost 
ingenuous disclaimers, the writer’s attempts to locate their particular statements as non-
ideological, non-prescriptive and both outside of and inured to any meta-narrative. As 
you may have noticed, all the texts we’ve read for this class, are laden with ideology and 
disclaimers against ideology of one form or another. Deleuze and Guattari make no such 
humble claims. Their work is pure unadulterated self proclaimed ideology. And this is 
why I like to think of A Thousand Plateaus as a kind of manifesto. It parodies its 
nietzschean claims about the fascist embedded in the individual, by taking the stance of 
the injunctive, the fascist herself. So keep this in mind when you’re writing the 
manifesto. The gamble with ideology that the postmodern author unwittingly enters into 
is exactly at the site of disjunction between the theory text and the manifesto. Somehow, 
Deleuze and Guattari have managed to produce both at once. Remember there is no 
manifesto without theory, and theory is of course an unacknowledged manifestation 
itself. I added this in for the purposes of your assignment, for which I think Deleuze and 
Guattari are a good model to study. They plagiarise a million writers as their own also 
with citation, and they produce their own ideology which is basically what you’re being 
asked to do.  
 
The other shift in the BwO when we get to Mille Plateaux, is in the capacity of an open 
sexuality very much operative in the writing. In anti-Oedipus, the discussion of the 
surface of inscription is suggestive—seductive even, but the erotic remains covered, 
covert. The emptied body becomes a surface of inscription, a surface for writing on, 
which reminds us of body inscription practices, tattooing, piercing; and, Peter 
Greenaway’s film the Pillow Book, where the main character requires that her lovers 
write calligraphy all over her body, and definitely Kafka’s short story a Penal Colony, [? 
check] a torture machine that cuts the prisoner’s sentence in blood, as an inscription onto 
his skin. But all of these erotic and violent connotations remain implicit. In “How To 
Make A BwO,” dead is this coy suggestion. In the latter we have a surprisingly 
pornographic description of what is to be done to the body, to the surface. We are told to 
sew it up. “(3) you begin sewing, you sew up the hole in the glans; you sew the skin 
around the glans to the glans itself, preventing the top from tearing; you sew the scrotum 
to the skin of the thighs. You sew the breasts, securely attaching a button with four holes 
to each nipple.” unquote [151] All orifices must  be sealed, in order to rid the body of the 
dreaded organism. This can be read very directly as a means of evacuating the body, 
dismantling its centralised and thus deeply fascistic structure. [remember Nietzsche and 
the fascist within] But this sewing up is described in a certain passivity, an anti-violence, 
a masochistic path to violence that takes the stance of absolute banality, or in the words 
of Hannah Arendt, who talked about the banality of evil in her account of the Adolph 
Eichman trial. But what is being suggested is that an extreme violence and refusal, refusal 
in the passive stance of the masochist, must be undergone to rid the body of itself. So 
with this essay, they enter into a new politics which eschews subjectivity but at the level 
of the subject herself.  
 
[BODY] 
  
Of course what is important about this essay is Deleuze and Guattari’s radical conception 
of the Body and moreover, the body’s central position in their overall philosophy. The 
BwO is a theory of the affective body based on the 17th century philosopher Spinoza. Like 
Deleuze and Guattari, Spinoza was a marginal figure, born in 1632, as Baruch Spinoza, 
the son of a Jewish merchant from Amsterdam, his father and grandfather were originally 
Spanish crypto-Jews -- that is, Jews who were forced to adopt Christianity in post-Islamic 
Spain, but secretly remained Jewish. He was educated in traditional Jewish Curriculum 
but his theological speculations were to prompt conflict with Jewish leaders after which 
he converted to Christianity, changing his name from Baruch to Benedict. In a another 
construction of mistaken identity, Spinoza’s Ethics is sometimes described as remaining 
Jewish in style despite his conversion. Maybe we can return to this question at the end. 
 
Spinoza was a contemporary of Descartes, who died 1650. The Ethics written around 15 
years later, 1663 is a fundamental negation of cartesianism, radical for its day. What we 
need to consider is the kind of thinking that we may have thought was scarcely possible 
for Spinoza at a time of theoretical and religious conservatism -  Postmodernism’s 
criticisms of Descartes or so called  cartesianism constructs a certain Cartesian epoch, 
that it renders philosophically primitive and inferior to its own theoretical illumination—
and yet what is uncovered in the Ethics is the most rigorous critique of cartesianism, 
centuries ahead of its time. In Spinoza there is no primacy of mind over body as in 
Descartes. Spinoza rejected the Cartesian mind body divide. This is not to say he recast 
the body as having primacy over the mind, rather according to the ethics, [and I quote] 
“what is an action in the mind is necessarily an action in the body as well, and what is a 
passion in the body is necessarily a passion in the mind.” There is no primacy of one 
series over the other. (we might add that something like this Spinozan view of the body 
can be found in Asian philosophy 2 thousand years ago. Deleuze and Guattari make 
reference to Taoism but I’m not going to go into this because their main source is 
Spinoza). 
 
Another thing I want to draw your attention to is the format in which Spinoza’s Ethics 
was written. Spinoza knew he was taking a risk which is why the Ethics is written in a 
non digital version of what can only be called hypertext. There are two books. The first 
has general axioms, for each axiom, and an expanded version with all the dangerous 
material was published in a second book. Further every axiom is followed by a list of 
axioms and definitions that can be cross referenced throughout the text. And before 
showing anyone the Ethics, and anticipating controversy, Spinoza wrote and “published 
anonymously his Tractatus Thologico-Politicus (1670) a treatise in which he defends the 
liberty to philosophise in the face of religious or political interference.” I think what is 
interesting here for later discussion, is again the style of writing, the format that a text 
takes and the political conditions under which it is produced. So think about not just what 
you want to say in your manifesto, but how you want to manifest? How the manifesto is 
produced is perhaps no different to what the manifesto says. Can we use Spinoza’s 
textual format, where the text becomes a kind of formal object, and think of the manifesto 
in this way as not simply text that communicates but as a body itself. 
 
  
To continue, the Ethics is remarkable not just in its very contemporary view of the body, 
but in the very conception of the body as central to his philosophy. This is where Deleuze 
and Guattari’s project echoes Spinoza’s. Spinoza offers philosophers in the late 17th 
century a new model: the body. He proposes to establish the body as a model, and I quote 
Spinoza “We do not know what the body can do…” This declaration is a provocation. 
“We speak of consciousness and its decrees, of the will and its effects, of the thousand 
ways of moving the body, of dominating the body and the passions—but we do not even 
know what a body can do…” As Nietzsche will say, “we stand amazed before 
consciousness, but the truly surprising thing is rather the body…” Today, the discourse 
on the body is well established, and even to the point of excess as Foucault argues, but in 
the time that Spinoza is writing, the claim that it is the body that is the correct subject of a 
moral philosophy, is truly radical and I want you to consider the historical conditions in 
which the ethics arises and ask what this does to the status of his theory? We can discuss 
this later. 
 
The Ethics elaborates a theory of the affective body, which is the unsaid topic of this 
lecture. It is the idea that the body is not mine, and it is neither constructed nor natural, 
instead, it is the sum total of its capacity to affect and to be affected by other bodies. The 
body is not separable from that which lies in a fictional outside of it, and that which 
belongs to a “me” but the body is that which has things happen to it and that from and 
through which other things have things happen to them.  
 
Spinoza says [and I quote:] . . . beings will be defined by their capacity for being affected, by the 
affections of which they are capable, the excitations to which they react, those by which they are 
unaffected, and those which exceed their capacity and make them ill or cause them to die. In this 
way, one will obtain a classification of beings by their power; one will see which beings agree 
with which others, and which do not agree with one another, as well as who can serve as food for 
whom, who is social with whom, and according to what relations. A man, a horse, and a dog; or 
more to the point, a philosopher and a drunkard, a hunting dog and a watchdog, a racehorse and a 
plow horse—are distinguished from one another by their capacity for being affected, and first of 
all by the way in which they fulfill and satisfy their life. (Ethics III 57) 
 
In this conception Spinoza distinguishes between two sorts of affections: [open quotation:] “actions, which 
are explained by the nature of the affected individual, and which spring from the individual’s essence; and 
passions, which are explained by something else, and originate outside the individual. Hence the capacity 
for being affected is manifested as a power of acting insofar as it is assumed to be filled by active 
affections, but as a power of being acted upon insofar as it is filled by passions.” Remember to suspend 
judgment about the kind of language he is using, essence and nature of the individual, (again, given the 
time he is writing when we don’t have people like Watney) which if we read this seriously, is in fact a 
negation of an essentialist or natural thinking of identity. 
 
\Af*fec"tion\, n. [F. affection, L. affectio, fr. afficere. See Affect.] 1. The act of affecting or acting upon; 
the state of being affected. 
 
And in turn DaG’s notion of the body is, just this, the sum total of its affections: its 
actions and passions. It is neither a bodily history nor a social construct nor an 
essential, natural body – but an affective body. (this is not unlike Foucault’s notion 
of power to rather than power over). 
 
  
In class, we’ve looked at criticisms of the two dominant paradigms of the body: 
objectification, or subjectification of the body: so firstly against objectification, theories 
against a natural biological genetically determined body, give way most convincingly in 
Foucault to the idea of the body as historically and politically determined. The body in 
this criticism is a social construction, an object of the state. We have seen this model of 
the body taken up in discourses on identity, where it is argued that if the body is a 
construct, then it can be made into whatever you want it to be. So the collective and 
social notion of the foucauldian body, is collapsed and an individual idea of the subject’s 
mutable body emerges. If the body is constructed then it can be reconstructed. Of course 
this has been criticised, as itself objectifying the body and ignoring certain facts of the so 
called “lived” body, that are not necessarily determined externally.  
 
DaG’s notion of body, the BwO is neither pure construct nor biological artifact, but a 
body without organs which turns out to be a process or set of processes. In the BwO, 
there is no I that passively receives a constructed body from the Other – society - at birth, 
nor is there a powerful I that constructs my body and makes me what I am. All there is is 
a multiplicity of affects or in Spinoza’s language affections (things that bodies do to each 
other and get done to them), the sum total of everything my body does to its outside and 
everything that comes to pass on the body itself. This is the BwO. They say I do not own 
“my” BwO because I happen on the BwO. What does this mean? If my body is the sum 
total of its capacity to affect and to be affected, then the body is no longer centralised by 
an internal “I” embodied in a centralised organic system attached to my notion of such an 
independent organism that is my self. Hence, the Body Without Organs. As you can see, 
this is radically different to any notions of the body you will have heard of, unless you 
have already heard of this. 
 
In How to Make yourself a BwO, the BwO is also described in terms of what they call 
the field of immanence, or the Plane of Consistency, another ubiquitous Deleuze-guattari-
ism that appears on almost every page of Mille Plateaux. The Plane of consistency here 
that plays the role of BwO is another way of elaborating the surface of inscription. If the 
affective body is no longer mine, but a multiplicity of affections involving other bodes 
and distributed over a surface, then this surface is the plane of immanence.  The field of 
immanence, they explain, is the plane of consistency specific to desire (with desire 
defined as “a process of production without reference to any exterior agency, whether it 
be a lack that hollows it out or a pleasure that fills it”). Immanence is also a really 
important term for Deleuze and Guattari because they use it in opposition to the notion of 
transcendence. Transcendent means beyond the real world, so a transcendent notion of 
god is a god is beyond the world of things, an external ephemeral agency. Immanence by 
contrast means in-dwelling, so an immanent notion of god is such that god dwells inside 
everything, every person every substance. They are against a transcendental philosophy, 
thus the statement: “the field of immanence that is the BwO, is not internal to the self, but 
neither does it come from an external self or a nonself.” The body is the ultimate reality 
and is its own reality, but I do not own it, there is no “my” body. They finish by saying 
that the plane of consistency is the totality of all BwO’s. 
 
  
So, the BwO is, the affective body, a distribution or inscription of forces and actions on 
the plane of immanence, which finally leads us to the question: How to Make for yourself 
a BodywO.  How to make the BwO turns out to be how to prepare the BwO such that it 
can maximise its affective potential. Deleuze and Guattari say: “what comes to pass on 
the BwO is not the same as how you make yourself one. [152] There are 2 phases: 
flogging and sewing. (pain and emptying) one phase for fabrication of BwO the other to 
make something circulate on it or pass across it.” Now if you’ve been paying attention, 
you may notice that this distinction is identical to the one drawn in anti-Oedipus when 
they say that production is different to the inscription of production. So the pain, I take to 
be increasing the affective capacity of the body literally through blows and the emptying 
procedure, the sewing up is the preparation and production of a continuous surface on 
which things come to pass on it. 
 
The prime exemplars they mention, for the affective body, are Drug users, masochists, 
schizophrenics, lovers - all ways of making the BwO. The masochist is their first 
example. [Quote:] “The masochist body is poorly understood in terms of pain; it is 
fundamentally a question of the BwO. . .the masochist is not looking for pain but also not 
looking for pleasure in a suspensive or roundabout way. The masochist looks for a BwO  
that only pain can fill, or travel over. . .” [unquote] He takes pain to subvert the desire as 
lack principle, that desire is lack of object of desire, or desire is pain in the absence of the 
object of desire. What this conception of desire fails to understand is the pleasure of 
desire itself. It isn’t that pleasure interrupts and discharges desire they claim; and the 
masochist is an attempt to subvert this by seeking pleasure in pain. What is really desired 
is desire itself not pleasure or pain which are effects of desire. [and I quote:] “The 
masochist’s suffering is the price he must pay, not to achieve pleasure, but to untie the 
pseudobond between desire and pleasure as an extrinsic measure” [155] Take note, this is 
another theory of immanence, pleasure is not an external agent that ends desire, rather 
pleasure arises immanently through and of desire. 
 
I wanted to extend their analysis of the masochists aims or motives and ask what is at 
stake in the very use of the masochist as their prime example? I think the reason for the 
masochist is it exemplifies not just a subversion of the construction of desire as the 
absence of pleasure but for its fascistic overtones. By taking the role of both master and 
slave, the self-appointed recipient of pain, the masochist directly engages with Deleuze 
and Guattari’s nietzschean project to rid the body of the organism, or the inner fascist. In 
Deleuze’s book, Coldness and Cruelty, a preface to Masoch’s, Venus in Furs, that they 
republished, Deleuze explains that the sadist and masochist are not diametric opposites of 
each other in a simple reversal. Masoch seeks out women to administer the pain and 
torture that he pursues. The woman in this role is not the same as the sadist, who seeks 
out a recipient of pain. The masochist has a special kind of passivity that Deleuze is 
particularly interested in, it is the master slave paradox, of the desire to enslave and be 
enslaved, the fascist. The masochist, externalises the fascist, in a reinscription on her 
body that becomes a BwO. So the masochist serves two purposes: the subversion of the 
lacanian notion of desire as lack, and also as a political project. Here we can see the 
double thinking that is characteristics of Deleuze and Guattari. 
 
  
But Deleuze and Guattari also suggest that the masochist has failed in what is starting to 
read as a stock postmodern disavowal, a disclaimer. the junkie exposes himself to a 
danger. But what is this danger and where have they failed? It seems  that although the 
junkie, (by emptying the BwO of sensation) and the masochist (by filling the BwO with 
pain) have subverted the structure of pleasure and desire, and perform a reinscription of 
the organic body, it appears that their activity is singular, rather than expansive, 
increasing the body’s potential for affectivity, the methodology is ultimately reductive. I 
think these are models for bodies that are lived according to a very intense affectivity. In 
going about our daily business we often forget our bodies; the junkie and the masochist 
cannot afford this forgetting. Such characters live in a hyper bodily state, their bodies 
take on a certain affective value. That being said, I think it would be to misinterpret 
Deleuze and Guattari to think that the BwO is an instruction to go out and take drugs or 
to engage in masochism. This is not their intention. The masochist and the junkie only 
give us a glimpse of something like the BwO that I think is a more ambitious project only 
implied in the essay. It begs the question, is their project feasible and if not do they have 
something else in mind? 
 
Question to the class: Can you use Deleuze and Guattari to criticise Rofes? 
 
So we have some limited examples of BwO, but still no How to Make Yourself a BwO. 
For this, Deleuze and Guattari introduce a third character, the French artist poet 
playwright philosopher, Antonin Artaud who as I mentioned earlier is the one to first 
speak of ridding the body of organs. Artaud spent the duration of WWII in a succession 
of lunatic asylums. “Artaud experienced delusions of buckets that contained mud that 
fucked, saw first hand the extracts that lay behind in dealing with carnal waste and the 
hand of God whose skin was beauty and who walked with a prosthetic limb 
occasionally.” Here he suffered and gained from all the aspects of starvation and 
underwent a myriad of bizarre treatments for his behavior including coma-inducing 
insulin therapy and electroshock therapy for these hallucinations. “Artaud is best known 
for his "Theater of Cruelty," a project based on his vision of cruelty as truth and as a 
transforming experience.” Antonin Artaud's last work produced after his release between 
1946 and 7, was a radio broadcast called To Have Done With The Judgment Of God in 
which he speaks about the BwO.  
 
Reading from the last page of To Have Done With The Judgment Of God, Artaud says: 
 
From whatever angle one approaches you, you are mad, mad enough to be tied down. 
 
—By having him undergo once more but for the last time a 
 session on the autopsy table in order to remake his anatomy. 
I say, in order to remake his anatomy. 
Man is sick because he is badly constructed. 
We must decide to strip him in order to scratch out this 
 Animalcule which makes him itch to death, 
 
   god, 
   and with god 
   his organs. 
 
  
For tie me down if you want to, 
But there is nothing more useless than an organ. 
 
When you have given him a body without organs, 
Then you will have delivered him from all his automatisms and 
 Restored him to his true liberty. 
 
Then you will teach him again to dance inside out 
as in the delirium of our accordion dances 
and that inside out will be his true side out. 
 
For Artaud the BwO demands a stripping away program; the ridding of organs is a 
ridding of everything civilising and organising about the body. Artaud aimed to reach 
The Body directly, to establish an existence for The Body in which all influence, all 
nature and all culture are torn away. Artaud wanted The Body to be by itself, honed to 
only bone and nerve, without family, society or religion. Deleuze and Guattari, extend 
Artaud’s monologue, explaining that the BwO is not the opposite of the organs. The 
organs are not its enemies. The enemy is the organism. The BwO is opposed not to the 
organs but to that organization of the organs called the organism.” And “The BwO is not 
opposed to the organs; rather the BwO and its “true organs,” which must be composed 
and positioned, are opposed to the organism, the organic organization of the organs . . . 
the organism is not at all the body, the BwO; rather, it is a stratum on the BwO, in other 
words, a phenomenon of accumulation, coagulation, and sedimentation that, in order to 
extract useful labour from the BwO, imposes upon it forms, functions, bonds, dominant 
and hierarchicized organizations, organized transcendences.” [158] Again the word 
labour here should remind you of the BwO in anti-Oedipus, which operates through the 
inscription of social codes as a means of extracting useful labour. 
 
Deleuze and Guattari say that the three great enemies: are Organism, subjectification, and 
significance. So far we’ve looked at the limitations of the body as organism, as well as 
their criticism of the body as subject, the idea of “my” body. Their polemic against 
signification already begun in anti-Oedipus is the artaudian project to rid the body of its 
capitalist inscription. They ask what does it mean to disarticulate, to cease to be an 
organism? [and I quote] “dismantling the organism means opening the body to 
connections that presuppose an entire assemblage, circuits, conjunctions…levels and 
thresholds, passages and distributions of intensity, and territories and deterritorializations 
measured with the craft of the surveyor”. Whereas this stripping the body of all 
signification might at first appear to be a reductive and nihilistic procedure, what is 
intended is an expansive dismantling, where everything encoded is dissolved and what 
remains is the BwO as a pure asignifying affective surface. The removal of codes and 
inscriptions they claim, leaves nothing to interpret; there is only the real. And I quote 
then: “The removal of text is a removal such that the body can no longer be 
restricted by the significatory constructions that it lives by.”  
And: 
the BwO is what remains when you take everything away. What you take away is precisely the 
phantasy, and significances and subjectifications as a whole. Psychoanalysis does the opposite: it 
translates everything into phantasies, it converts everything into phantasy, it retains the phantasy. 
It royally botches the real, because it botches the BwO. 
 
  
The organs distribute themselves on the BwO, but they distribute themselves  independently of the 
form of the organism; forms become contingent, organs are no longer anything more than 
intensities that are produced , flows , thresholds, and gradients. It is not at all a question of a 
fragmented , splintered body, of organs without the body (Owb). The BwO is exactly the opposite. 
There are not organs in the sense of fragments in relation to a lost unity, nor is there a return to the 
undifferentiated in relation to a differentiable totality. There is a distribution of intensive principles 
of organs, with their positive indefinite articles, within a collectivity or multiplicity, inside an 
assemblage, and according to machinic connections operating on a BwO. [164] 
 
So they’re not talking about an emptying of the body but instead, erasing the dominant 
inscription of its surfaceby the indefinite article they mean, pure possibility, making it 
pure flow without the blockage of signification. 
 
Now, in their formulation of taking everything away, the body becomes maximum 
potentiality or what they call pure becoming,. The concept of becoming is arguably the 
most important concept in Deleuze and Guattari and takes many forms in Mille Plateaux. 
In this essay it functions as a new model for identity, becoming-other. They start with 
becoming-animal. It is this becoming that is the key to the BwO. So, what can becoming-
animal, becoming-dog even mean? When the schizophrenic becomes dog, it isn’t that he 
actually becomes a dog or that he is in a relation of representation with the dog, a 
metaphor for dog, rather what Deleuze and Guattari intend for becoming-dog is critical a 
participating in ‘dogness,’ in what it means to be a dog. So the patient takes on specific 
rituals that the real dog enters into, inverting the structure, becoming-dog. Similarly, they 
say the man becoming-horse implicitly states, quote: “what happens to a horse can also 
happen to me . . . [they claim] the masochist effects an inversion of signs: the horse 
transmits its transmitted forces to him, so that the masochist’s innate forces will in turn be 
tamed.” Becoming-animal for Deleuze and guattari is a direct mode of engaging with the 
BwO. If this makes no sense, another more general example they use of becoming is the 
wasp and the flower. The wasp is becoming-flower and the flower becoming-wasp at the 
moment of transaction where the wasp collects the flowers pollen. They form what DaG 
call a desiring machine. It’s the idea of shared identity and identity based on actions/ 
passions.  
 
BwO    affections/affectsbecoming otherbecoming womanOwB 
Anti-Oedipe and  Mille Plateaux  Spinoza Artaud Elizabeth Grosz? 
  
I’m going to read out an analysis of Artaud’s art work to give you an idea of the becoming other 
that he entered into in quite an intense way. In drawings titled "The being and its foetuses" and 
"Never real and always true" the figures appeared acutely disjointed, manipulated with precision 
to occupy a space of dismemberment. Sections of metal, insects, child-like female faces, internal 
organs, spilled out in painful dispersal across the scorched surface of the paper. Superannuated 
machinery and propeller shapes intersected with incandescent human shapes and lacerated faces. 
As the drawings developed Artaud often surrounded and penetrated them with phrases from an 
invented rhythmic pre-Babel language, which he continually elaborated, inserting it as an enraged 
incantation into his work. In a Deleuzian construct Artaud's drawings produce images of 
sensations and forces. Artaud makes patent an experience of the body that leads one beyond the 
phenomenological "lived body" to the chaotic "body without organs". The body in Artaud’s work 
is always in a process of becoming other – becoming-animal, becoming-molecular, becoming-
imperceptible –Artaud is illustrating sensations in the sense that he depicts the un-organized and 
non-organic sensations of the body without organs. The encircling force of the field isolates the 
  
figure, disconnects it from any latent narratives and consequently empties it of purely 
figurative/representational content..  
 
So to recap: The BwO starts with an affective theory of the body: the sum total of all its 
affections, its actions and passions. But the affective body exists in a permanent state of 
pure becoming, since its potential for affection is great. The BwO is becoming-other a 
state that is reached by uninscribing the surface, refusing the organisation of the body 
around its organs, instead existing according to all the affections and affects that it does 
and can potentially enter into. Deleuze and Guattari say that the subject is a process of 
multiple becoming, in which anything can be connected to anything else. Deleuze 
proposes an alternative notion of subjectivity—becoming-other, but we can only be freed 
2 become other if the BwO is rendered a blank surface of asignification that receives 
affection but never inscription. In this idea of identity as becoming, Peter asked a good 
question: was Spinoza becoming Christian when he converted? Can we think about 
becoming-other in relation to Paris is Burning? Was Venus Extravaganza becoming-
woman or something else? Is drag-performance a becoming woman, what about 
becoming-family and the houses of extravaganza, La Beija, etc.  
 
[don’t read this out] 
But the key term of Mille Plateaux, devenir, [Becoming] is problematic in its translation as 
Becoming.  Devenir is the infinitive form of the verb. Infinitive means unlimited, without 
temporal or logical restriction, that is, without a “tense” or a “mood.” Now in French the infinitive 
form can be used as a noun whereas this is not the case in English: we don’t say “a to-become” or 
“a to-be.”  English, obviously cannot do this, so Massumi translates devenir with 
“becoming.”  “Becoming,” on the other hand, is a verb that functions as a noun: “a becoming” or 
in other cases a present participle, a verb form that functions as part of a verb phrase: “the wasp is 
becoming the orchid,” or as a modifier: “the wasp, becoming the orchid ...” In these latter cases of 
becoming as a present participle, there is a temporal restriction to the present. This is important to 
recognize because, as Deleuze/Guattari explains an infinitive, even though it is not temporally 
restricted, is not “indeterminate” with regard to time; rather it expresses the “floating, pure event 
or of becoming.”  
 
This idea becoming-other culminates in a controversial notion of DaG’s called 
Becoming-Woman, the ultimate form of becoming-other, that was both widely 
criticised and embraced among feminist writers.  
 
Iragaray expresses the suspicion that “becoming-woman” is an excuse for yet another 
male appropriation of whatever is radical or subversive in feminist politics.  
 
Rosi Braidotti asks “whether feminists, at this point in their history of collective struggles 
aimed at redefining female subjectivity, actually afford to let go of their sex-specific 
forms of political agency? [she asks] is the bypassing of gender in favour of a dispersed 
polysexuality not a very masculine model which claims to get rid of sexual difference. 
What results is the dissolution of the claim to specificity voiced by women. . .Only a man 
would idealize sexual neutrality”  
 
Elizabeth Grosz claims that the metaphor “becoming woman” is a male appropriation of 
women’s struggles theories knowledges insofar as it borrows from them while 
depoliticising their radicality. . . she goes on to say that they not only neutralize women’s 
  
sexual specificity, but more insidiously, they also neutralise and thereby mask men’s 
specificities… 
 
Deleuze and Guattari do not specify what a feminine becoming-woman might be. 
 
 
 
Simone Brott 
March 2002 
 
 
 
